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1
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici are professors and scholars who teach and
write on economic theory and method, particularly
with respect to natural resources and the
environment. Amici have an interest in seeing that
the Court is informed on the appropriate use of
economic analysis in the implementation of § 316(b)
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b), commonly referred to as the Clean Water
Act (CWA).
The end of this brief summarizes the amici’s
qualifications and affiliations. Amici file this brief
solely as individuals and not on behalf of the
institutions with which they are affiliated.1
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

INTRODUCTION
This brief discusses the roles of various forms of
economic analysis. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) aims
to identify allocatively efficient actions. Economists,
however, have developed other forms of analysis for
other purposes. Administrative agencies concerned
about technology’s economic availability have
1

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other
than amici, their institutions, or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission.
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employed economic models that compare costs, not to
benefits, but to regulated firm’s financial capabilities
to predict whether regulated firms can afford the best
technology. This brief discusses the relationship of
financial, cost-benefit, and cost effectiveness analysis
to EPA’s task as an agent of the elected legislature
carrying out the instructions issued in § 316(b) of the
CWA, concerning the regulation of cooling water
intake. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,
430 U.S. 112, 138 (1976) (describing the question
before the Court as “what Congress intended for these
regulations,” not “what a court thinks . . . generally
appropriate to the regulatory process”) [emphasis in
original].
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Electricity generating plants often withdraw
water from rivers, lakes, and other waterways in
order to manage excess heat generated during their
production processes. EPA estimates that cooling
water intake kills over 3.4 billion fish and shellfish
(expressed as “age 1 equivalents”) by either trapping
organisms against components of the cooling water
intake structure or drawing them into the cooling
water system itself. Pet.App.170a-172a (69 Fed. Reg.
at 41,586).2 These two mortality threats, referred to
2

Citations to Pet.App. refer to the appendix filed in No.
07-588.
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as “impingement” and “entrainment,” affect not only
the various fish and shellfish species for which EPA
has been able to generate quantitative estimates, but
also certain threatened and endangered species, such
as sea turtles, Chinook salmon, and steelhead, as well
as immeasurable quantities of phytoplankton and
zooplankton that lie at the base of aquatic food
chains. Moreover, impingement and entrainment are
only the most obvious and measurable adverse effects
of cooling water intake on aquatic ecosystems.
Cognizant of these kinds of informational
difficulties, Congress in § 316(b) mandated that “the
location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling
water intake structures [must] reflect the best
technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). In 1995,
EPA agreed to a consent decree that required the
agency to establish cooling water intake rules in
multiple phases. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358
F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2004) (Riverkeeper I);
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Riverkeeper II).
Phase I, involving new facilities, generally
required facilities to achieve environmental
performance standards based on what is known as
“closed-cycle cooling technology,” a process in which
cooling water is recycled and only periodically
replenished from neighboring waterways, rather than
continuously withdrawn and discharged. Although
environmentalists had argued on behalf of a more
stringent “dry cooling technology,” the Second Circuit
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accepted EPA’s conclusion that the expense of this
technology rendered it not reasonably available to
industry. See Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195-96;
Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 99 n.11.
Phase II involved large existing power plants.
EPA’s final regulations for this phase set forth a
complicated array of compliance options that were
built around a set of impingement and entrainment
performance standards. According to EPA’s own
analysis, the Phase II rules allowed many facilities
to avoid water intake reductions altogether. See
EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the Final
Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule,
EPA-821-R-04-005, February 2004, at D1-1 (Final
Rule EBA).3 Even where the rules required reductions,
they formally mandated no more than 80 and 60
percent reductions, respectively, in impingement and
entrainment. See Pet.App.189a-190a (69 Fed. Reg. at
41,590); Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 105-08. EPA
identified no single technology as the best available
technology and offered no specific rationale for these
numbers. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 106.
Notably, EPA declined to use closed-cycle cooling
technology as the benchmark against which other
proposed protection measures might be evaluated.
Despite acknowledging that impingement and
3

This document is available at http://www.epa.gov/
waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/final.htm (last visited
September 29, 2008).
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entrainment provide the “primary and distinct types
of harmful impacts associated with the use of cooling
water intake structures,” Pet.App.226a (69 Fed. Reg.
at 41,598), and that “closed-cycle, recirculating
cooling towers . . . can reduce mortality from
impingement by up to 98 percent and entrainment by
up to 98 percent,” Pet.App.239a-240a (69 Fed. Reg. at
41,601), EPA nevertheless adopted weaker standards.
The agency did so because it considered the cost
of technologies in relation to the reductions in
impingement mortality and entrainment achieved.
Pet.App.250a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,603). This
efficiency-oriented approach had a significant effect
on regulatory stringency: EPA estimated that 125
facilities would adopt no impingement and
entrainment controls at all under the Phase II rules.
See Final Rule EBA, supra, at D1-1. Moreover, rather
than up to 98 percent reduction in impingement and
entrainment, as attained by closed-cycle cooling
technology, the agency estimated that most facilities
would only achieve between 30.9-59.0 percent
reduction in impingement and between 16.4-47.9
percent reduction in entrainment. Id. at C3-2.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded
the Phase II regulations almost in their entirety. The
basic defect of the rules, in the panel’s view, was
EPA’s apparent decision to use CBA to identify the
performance standard that could be attained by “the
best technology available for minimizing adverse
impact.” According to the Second Circuit, such
best availability technology (BAT) requirements
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necessitate a different implementation approach:
Because “Congress itself [already has] defined the
basic relationship between costs and benefits,” EPA’s
responsibility is simply to identify the most
environmentally protective technology available at a
cost that can be “reasonably borne” by the regulated
industry. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 99 (quoting
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490, 509 (1981)).
On April 14, 2008, this Court granted certiorari
to determine “whether Section 316(b) of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), authorizes the [EPA]
to compare costs with benefits in determining the
‘best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact’ at cooling water intake
structures.” See PSEG Fossil LLC v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,
128 S. Ct. 1867, 1868 (2008).
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 316(b) does not authorize CBA because
the ratio of costs to benefits has no relevance to a
decision about what constitutes the “best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental
impacts.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). Determination of which
technology best minimizes negative environmental
impacts requires a comparative engineering
evaluation of competing technologies’ capacities to
reduce environmental impacts. See Train, 430 U.S.
at 131 (describing statutory provisions governing
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technology-based water pollution rules as requiring
an
assessment
of
available
technology’s
“effectiveness”); Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v.
EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 475-76 (2004) (discussing EPA’s
use of comparative “top-down” analysis to determine
the “best available control technology” for air
pollution). Under § 316(b), this engineering analysis
focuses primarily on identifying technologies that
minimize water intake that disrupt ecology and kill
fish. Neither compliance cost nor its relationship to
benefits is relevant to identification of the technology
minimizing environmental impact.
Consideration of a technology’s economic
availability requires an economic analysis that
compares compliance costs to the financial resources
of regulated firms, rather than comparing these costs
to environmental benefits. To the extent that a
technology proves so costly that an industry cannot
afford to purchase it, it might be considered
unavailable. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone
Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 74 (1980) (describing maximizing
technology’s use “within” an owner’s “economic
capability” as a site-specific application of the best
available technology concept). The dollar value of
water quality benefits, however, does not bear on
whether a technology is available, as a technology’s
economic availability is solely a function of the
relationship between costs and regulated firms’
finances.
Economic
analysis
should
decisionmakers’ legally appropriate

serve
goals.

the
CBA
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focuses on decisions about whether an environmental
program is economically desirable in the abstract, a
task that Congress often reserves for its own
determination. See generally David M. Driesen, The
Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 Ecology L.
Q. 545, 605-13 (1997) (discussing CBA’s compatibility
with a general legislative power). Since the elected
legislature already has concluded that clean water is
worth the necessary costs, it may rationally have
assigned EPA the more limited role of deciding which
available technologies maximize environmental
protection. Cf. Alaska, 540 U.S. at 485 n.12
(discussing similar Clean Air Act provisions); David
M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental,
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility
Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory
Reform, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 19-21 (2005)
(Feasibility Principle) (discussing similar provisions).
Elected representatives chose a BAT approach in
order to maximize ecological restoration subject only
to a technological availability constraint. The
availability constraint addresses distributional
concerns about plant shutdowns leading to
unemployment, not concerns about net benefits.
While CBA in principle supports efforts to identify
allocatively efficient pollution levels, financial models
provide appropriate tools for predicting whether
pollution control costs might lead to plant shutdowns,
instead of the employment increases that pollution
control expenditures often produce. Cf. Eban
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Goodstein, The Trade-Off Myth: Fact and Fiction
About Jobs and the Environment 20 (1999)
(associating environmental regulation with a small
net increase in employment); Richard Morgenstern et
al., Jobs Versus the Environment: An Industry-Level
Perspective, 43 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 412, 413-14
(2002) (finding environmental regulation likely
increased employment modestly in the plastics,
petroleum, steel, and pulp and paper industries).
Elected representatives may choose a BAT
construct over CBA because of concerns about the
feasibility of correlating costs and benefits in the
water pollution context. CBA requires correlation of
monetized marginal water quality benefits with the
marginal cost of technologies. Because any
technology’s effect on environmental quality varies
with the quality of each relevant water body, water
pollution control technology always yields important
water quality benefits that cannot be quantified and
vast uncertainties about those that can be. A BAT
approach may be desirable precisely because it avoids
the need to link environmental protection
expenditures to marginal water quality benefits, as
CBA demands.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
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ARGUMENT
I.

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IS A WELFARE
ECONOMIC DECISION PROCEDURE

To understand why CBA has proven controversial
in the environmental, health, and safety context –
and to perceive why Congress might have eschewed
EPA’s use of it in § 316(b) – it is necessary to know
more about CBA than its surface resemblance to
“common sense” or “basic rationality.”4

4

See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Parties (“Federal Brief ”), at
13 (“In everyday life, people routinely weight costs against
benefits in deciding whether to do something.”); Brief of
Petitioner Utility Water Act Group (“UWAG Br.”), at 28 (calling
“irrational” any interpretation of § 316(b) that would prevent
“translating . . . costs and benefits into economic terms for
comparison”); UWAG Brief at 57 (“In the broadest sense, costbenefit balancing is a fundamental tool of logical
decisionmaking.”); Brief of Petitioners Entergy Corp., PSEG
Fossil LLC, and PSEG Nuclear, at 29 (“At a basic level, what
respondents and the Second Circuit denigrate as ‘cost-benefit
analysis’ is nothing more than common sense – the imperative of
basic rationality that actions do more good than harm.”); Brief of
Amici Curiae The AEI Center for Regulatory and Market
Studies and 33 Individual Economists in Support of Petitioners,
at 5 (“[A]s a general principle, regulators cannot make rational
decisions unless they are allowed to compare costs and
benefits. . . .”).
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A. Cost-Benefit Analysis Aims to Identify
Allocatively Efficient Regulation Based
on Monetized Estimates of Policy
Impacts on Human Well-Being
CBA serves as a tool for identifying allocatively
efficient regulation, defined as regulation that
generates costs equaling benefits at the margin. See
Tom Tietenberg, Environmental Economics and
Policy 25 (4th ed. 2004); 1 Handbook of
Environmental
Economics:
Environmental
Degradation and Institutional Responses 253-54
(Karl-Goran Maler & Jeffrey R. Vincent eds. 2003). In
technical terms, CBA pursues Kaldor-Hicks, rather
than Pareto, efficiency. The latter standard only
approves projects that make at least one individual
better off and no one worse off. The former standard
approves projects so long as “losers” could, in theory,
be compensated adequately from project gains
to make them no worse off. See Joseph Persky,
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Classical Creed, 15 J.
Econ. Perspectives 199, 201 (2001). What this means
in plain terms is that CBA only seeks to promote
value as such and does not compensate those who
lose from the enhancement of efficiency. See Nicholas
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economic and
Inter-personal Comparisons of Utility, 49 Econ. J.
549, 550 (1939).
In order to compare costs and benefits, CBA
evaluates policy choices’ diverse consequences
according to a single numerical rubric. Accordingly,
the framework asks regulators to predict, weight, and
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aggregate policy impacts in dollar terms. Once
relevant policy impacts have been estimated and
monetized in this manner, regulators can use CBA to
select the point of marginal equivalence between
social costs and benefits. Similarly, many economists
and other commentators believe that application of
CBA to a range of existing and proposed risk
regulation programs can provide society with a basis
for making efficient use of the entire regulatory
budget that it devotes to risk prevention. See
generally Stephen Breyer, Breaking The Vicious
Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (1993).
In theory, CBA values anticipated policy effects
according to the monetary amount that affected
individuals would be willing to pay if the effect under
consideration were traded in an economic market.
See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and
Safety Regulation?, 272 Science 221, 222 (1996). This
willingness-to-pay approach to valuation makes the
desirability of CBA’s results contingent on the
desirability of the underlying distribution of wealth
and entitlements out of which valuations are being
generated.
Once EPA identifies a technology capable of
reducing environmental impacts, it can use market
data to estimate facilities’ compliance costs, which
constitute the principle direct cost of regulation.
Neither the consideration of cost nor this approach to
its valuation is unique to CBA.
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Valuation of regulatory benefits – consisting of
averted harms such as human death and illness,
species loss, or environmental degradation – poses
greater challenges. EPA can often choose the best
technologies for minimizing environmental impacts
by simply comparing the percentage of effluent or
water intake reduction of competing technologies. To
do this, the agency does not need to know anything
about the quality of adjacent waters.
To quantify and monetize the environmental
benefits a technology might generate, however, EPA
must consider the quality of adjacent waters and the
myriad ecological impacts that effluent or water
intake might have. These values and impacts will
vary. For waters most in need of environmental
improvement, the value of benefits may be less than
for waters that require little protection. Water intake
technologies may protect few fish in depleted fisheries
(at least in the short run), but may generate high
benefits estimates in waters with a thriving fishery.
CBA typically entails the monetization of
quantified benefits based on individual willingness to
pay. Existing markets will not provide reliable price
information for such benefits. Accordingly, in the
environmental context, the CBA practitioner must
attempt to identify individual valuations of averted
harms through indirect or hypothetical means. Even
within the economics profession, much theoretical
and methodological controversy has surrounded the
development and use of such valuation techniques.
See, e.g., Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit
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Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 931, 949 (2000)
(strongly criticizing conventional willingness-to-pay
measurement approaches).
B. By its Nature, Cost-Benefit Analysis
Cannot Address Many Aspects of Law
and Policy
CBA embraces welfare economic assumptions
about how value is defined and measured. According
to economic theory, willingness to pay reflects the
strength of individual preferences for various goods.
Use of a methodology based on estimates of private
preferences for avoiding death, illness, and
environmental degradation assumes that people’s
purchase decisions should determine value. See
Bryan Norton, Robert Costanza, and Richard C.
Bishop, The Evolution of Preferences: Why ‘Sovereign’
Preferences May Not Lead to Sustainable Policies and
What to Do About It, 24 Ecol. Econ. 193 (1998). Thus,
the weight assigned to matters as basic as the
existence of a fish species or the death of a human
being derives from individualistic market behavior.
This contrasts with a model of collective value
choices, such as political choices that create
individual rights or give special weight to matters
deemed fundamentally important for reasons not
rooted in welfare economics. Cf. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr.,
Comment: Does Benefit Cost Analysis Stand Alone?
Rights and Standing, 10 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt.
96, 96 n.2 (1991) (observing that when uncertainty
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over legal rights “extends beyond the margin, benefit
cost analysis will be of little help”); James M.
Buchanan, Freedom in Constitutional Contract:
Perspectives of a Political Economist (1977); Laurence
H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 Yale L. J.
1315 (1974). This Court has implicitly held that
Congress made such value choices in the Clean Air
Act and the Endangered Species Act. See TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 176-84 (1978) (recognizing that
Congress decided to save each endangered species, no
matter what the cost); Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (recognizing
that Congress chose, in the Clean Air Act, to protect
public health). In the CWA, this Court has likewise
recognized that Congress chose to adopt an
overarching goal of ecological restoration, U.S. v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 132-33
(1985) (describing the CWA as a “comprehensive
legislative attempt ‘to restore’ ” the waters’ ecological
integrity), which is served by subsidiary goals of zero
discharge of pollutants and protection of fish, see 33
U.S.C. § 1251.
When such goals are recognized as politically- or
normatively-imposed constraints, economic theory
evaluates them under frameworks that are
analytically distinct from conventional cost-benefit
optimization. For instance, an extensive economic
literature exists analyzing environmental and
natural
resource
decisionmaking
under
“sustainability” or “safe minimum standard”
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constraints. See, e.g., Alan Randall & Michael C.
Farmer, Benefits, Costs and the Safe Minimum
Standard of Conservation, in The Handbook of
Environmental Economics 26 (Daniel Bromley ed.
1995); Richard B. Howarth, Sustainability Under
Uncertainty: A Deontological Approach, 71 Land
Econ. 417 (1995); Richard B. Norgaard & Richard B.
Howarth, Sustainability and Discounting the Future,
in Ecological Economics: The Science and
Management of Sustainability 88 (Robert Costanza
ed. 1991); Richard C. Bishop, Endangered Species
and Uncertainty: The Economics of a Safe Minimum
Standard, 60 Am. J. Ag. Econ. 10 (1978).
Taking the ecological restoration goal seriously
requires efforts on a variety of fronts when the
immediate benefits produced are small. CBA,
however, calls for scaling down efforts when resources
are in serious trouble, because then individual
actions produce small measurable marginal benefits.
Furthermore, the ecological restoration goal requires
confronting the complex, causally interrelated nature
of ecosystems, which often frustrates attempts to
manage for allocative efficiency. See Orrin H. Pilkey
& Linda Pilkey Jarvis, Useless Arithmetic 6-7, 10-21
(2007) (explaining how reliance on widely used
mathematical models to set sustainable catch levels
led to a fisheries collapse). CBA, for instance,
struggles to address catastrophic or non-linear
potentialities, since CBA typically assumes a smooth
continuous world in which median expectation values
provide reasonably reliable decision criteria. Martin
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Weitzman, The Stern Review of the Economics of
Climate Change, 45 J. Econ. Lit. 703 (2007)
(questioning the value of conventional CBA in the
face of climate change’s deep structural uncertainty
and potentially extreme worst case consequences).
Even
assuming
complete
and
reliable
information, CBA would not prove useful in all law
and policy contexts. Any formal decisionmaking
system such as CBA must – by its very nature –
exclude from evaluation some relevant parameters of
the decisions that the system aims to resolve. CBA
may be appropriate in some circumstances, but it is
not an alternative to foundational political choices
like those found in the Constitution and, in some
cases, in environmental law. It is imperative,
therefore, to recognize that CBA cannot be “read into”
all of a society’s statutes or viewed as an all-purpose
policy device. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604, 626 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(criticizing “totality of the circumstances” and
“freestanding ‘reasonableness’ ” tests in the due
process context and warning against “injecting them
into the core of our American practice”).
II.

COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
IS
NOT
RELEVANT TO IDENTIFICATION OF THE
BEST TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE FOR
MINIMIZING ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT

As Congress’s agent, EPA must follow statutory
instructions establishing policies for EPA rulemaking.
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Therefore, when used to implement specific statutes,
EPA’s economic analysis must examine the factors
that congressional policies make relevant, without
considering factors irrelevant to its instructions.
See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 507-12 (holding that
cost-benefit analysis is not a relevant factor when
a statute demands maximum feasible emission
reductions); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1971) (holding that
cost-benefit balancing was not among the relevant
factors for determining whether it was “feasible” to
route a highway around a park); Union Electric Co. v.
EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257-65 (1976) (holding that cost is
not a relevant factor in EPA assessment of state
implementation plans under the Clean Air Act). The
relationship of costs to benefits is not among the
factors relevant to determining the “best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
A. Engineering Analysis Identifies the
“Best” Technology for Minimizing
Adverse Environmental Impact
Identification of the “best technology . . . for
minimizing environmental impacts” requires an
engineering analysis of competing technologies’
environmental performance characteristics. In the
effluent reduction context, the “best” technologies
generally minimize the amount of water pollution
being discharged. See Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 74
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(describing BAT as committing “the maximum
resources economically possible to the” pollution
elimination goal); see also Alaska, 540 U.S. at 489-90
n.13 (describing requirements for “best available
control technology” as requiring “the technology that
can best reduce pollution within practical
constraints”) (emphasis added). The focus on water
intake in § 316(b) generally requires an inverse
analysis focused on identifying technologies that
minimize the amount of water taken from lakes,
streams, and rivers to cool industrial facilities. As a
rule, technologies minimizing water intake kill less
fish and disrupt a water body’s ecology less than
technologies that use more water. See Riverkeeper II,
475 F.3d at 101 n.16 (noting EPA’s general
assumption that reductions in water flow
proportionally
reduce
impingement
and
entrainment); Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 194 (“EPA
acknowledges that dry cooling” virtually eliminates
water intake and “dramatically reduces impingement
and entrainment”).
The analysis of which technologies minimize
adverse environmental impacts may take into
account a broad range of impacts. EPA may, for
example, take into account adverse air pollution
impacts associated with water pollution technology.
See, e.g., Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 194-95 (allowing
EPA to consider the air pollution associated with
energy efficiency penalties for dry cooling technology
as a basis for rejecting it); Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d
at 99 n.11 (describing its prior decision to uphold
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EPA’s rejection of dry cooling as based on its negative
environmental effects and unbearable cost). The
amount of economic cost a facility will incur to install
a technology, such as an environmentally superior
water intake system, has no bearing on the question
of
which
technology
minimizes
adverse
environmental impacts.
Market participants generally use the term
“best” in conjunction with any technology to signify
the highest quality item regardless of cost. See
generally Bailey v. U.S., 516 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1995)
(holding that courts must give a term its ordinary
meaning considering not just its “bare meaning,” but
also its “placement and purpose” in context). Thus,
consumer discussions of whether a Blackberry or an
I-Phone is the “best” cell phone or whether an Apple
or a PC is the “best” computer focus on design and
features, i.e. on figuring out which technology works
best for its intended purpose. Similarly, advertisers
use the term “best” as a signifier of high quality. See,
e.g., Bradley Johnson & Alice Z. Cuneo, AT&T,
Goodby Look to Ax mLife, Advertising Age, July 14,
2003, at 1, 26 (contrasting advertisements focused on
price with the claim that AT&T has the “best
technology”); Ad Spending of ‘100’ Edges Upward,
Advertising Age, Sept. 28, 1988, at 36 (describing Bell
Atlantic as having the “best technology” because its
telecommunications capabilities are the “fastest, with
the most interesting applications.”).
Economists, however, sometimes use the term
“best policy” as signifying a balance between cost and
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benefits. And, similarly, consumers sometimes use the
term “best purchase” to signify a balance between
costs and benefits. But the term “best technology,” in
ordinary parlance, means the best technology for its
intended purpose – here minimizing (not just
addressing) environmental impacts.
B. Economic Analysis Comparing Costs
to Facilities’ Economic Capabilities
Evaluates a Technology’s “Availability”
However, § 316(b) qualifies its demand that EPA
formulate standards based upon the environmentally
best technologies by insisting that the technologies be
“available.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). A technology that is
technically or economically infeasible may not be
available. See National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 75
(describing the best available technology provisions
as requiring employment of the “best measures
economically and technologically feasible”); Driesen,
Feasibility Principle, supra, at 21 (describing BAT
requirements as exemplars of the feasibility principle,
which maximizes reductions except when doing so
causes widespread plant shutdowns). Accordingly,
EPA properly employs economic analysis to determine
whether a technology is available.
Economic analysis focused on technological
availability models the relationship of costs to
regulated facility owners’ economic capabilities. See
Alaska, 540 U.S. at 498 (upholding EPA’s rejection of
a disproportionate cost argument, because a finding
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of economic infeasibility requires financial data,
which the regulated firm withheld). This financial
analysis of an industry, combined with an analysis of
technical feasibility (whether the technology works
properly for the industry as a whole), allows the
agency to determine the limits of firms’ capabilities.
See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 508-09 (defining feasible
regulation as that which is “capable of being done
. . . ”); see, e.g., Riverkeeper I, 358 F.2d at 195 (EPA
found “dry cooling” technically infeasible for some
facilities). Thus, in regulating water intake, EPA
compared the costs of technologies reducing water
intake to the revenues of the regulated facilities,
Final Rule EBA, supra, at B2 (analyzing cost to
revenue ratios at the firm and facility level);
Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 194 n.21 (discussing the
percentage of revenue necessary to fund “dry cooling”
technology), in order to evaluate whether
environmentally
desirable
technologies
were
economically available to the industry, see id. at 195
(EPA found that dry cooling requirements for new
facilities would discourage their construction);
Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 99 n.11 (characterizing
Riverkeeper I approval of EPA’s rejection of dry
cooling as “ultimately” based on EPA finding dry
cooling “too expensive for industry to reasonably
bear” and air pollution impacts); see also
Pet.App.272a-273a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,608-09)
(finding dry cooling unavailable for existing facilities
because it “carries costs that would potentially
cause significant closures.”). If the cost of an
environmentally valuable technology creates a
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long-term excess of cost over revenue, requiring that
technology may lead to bankruptcy and/or the
shutdown of facilities. See Effluent Limitations for the
Meat and Poultry Products Point Source Category, 69
Fed. Reg. 54,476, 54,511, 54,514 (September 8, 2004)
(closure comes from regulation producing “negative
long-term earnings” at the facility or company level).
A rule that shuts down a significant portion of an
industry does not cause the technology to be
employed, because it may not be economically
available to the industry as a whole.5
Accordingly,
in
evaluating
technological
availability, EPA frequently uses economic models
focused on industry finances. See, e.g., National
Wildlife Federation (NWF) v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554, 565
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing EPA’s use of the Altman
bankruptcy model); Effluent Limitations for the Iron
and Steel Manufacturing Source Category, 67 Fed.
Reg. 64,216, 64,244 (October 17, 2002) (Iron & Steel)
(EPA selected Altman’s Z model to evaluate
bankruptcy possibilities after a review of corporate
financial distress models in the economic literature).
5

Likewise, if the compliance cost associated with a
technology required of new sources becomes so onerous that new
facilities do not open, it might be correct to say that the
technology is not “available” to new facilities. See Effluent
Limitations for the Industrial Laundries Point Source Category,
Withdrawal of Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,072, 45,079
(August 18, 1999) (EPA conducts a “ ‘barrier-to-entry analysis’ to
determine whether . . . compliance costs would have prevented a
new source from entering the market.”).
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Financial analysts and others use financial models to
evaluate whether a projected cost increment might
bankrupt firms and/or lead to facility closures. See
Edward A. Altman & Edith Hotchkiss, Corporate
Financial Distress and Bankruptcy 234-35 (2006)
(discussing financial institutions’ use of models to
predict repayment risk). Such models may take into
account earnings, assets, liabilities, and other factors
relevant to predicting bankruptcy or closures. See id.
at 241-43 (discussing model components).
Economists use a concept of price elasticity to
analyze the question of when facility owners must
bear costs imposed on them in order to avoid sales
declines or, instead, will succeed in passing them on
to customers. See, e.g., Effluent Limitations for the
Metal Products and Machinery Point Source Category
Notice of Data Availability, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,752,
38,769 (June 5, 2002) (Metal Products) (stating that
EPA estimated the “cost elasticity of price.”). For
goods and services with few or no substitutes,
consumer demand may remain steady even as prices
rise. See Effluent Limitations for the Transportation
Equipment Cleaning Point Source Category, 65 Fed.
Reg. 49,666, 49,688 (August 14, 2000) (predicting that
price increases would cause little decline in output in
a sector offering an essential service). Industry
competitiveness is also relevant to a firm’s ability to
pass on costs and, thus, EPA employs econometric
models and analyzes market structure to estimate
how much of projected regulatory cost facilities must
actually pay. See, e.g., Metal Products, 67 Fed. Reg. at
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38,768-69. Price rises reflecting regulatory costs,
if significant and not shared by all relevant
competitors, can cause a firm to lose market share,
another possible route to bankruptcy. Cf. Adam B.
Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the
Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing, What Does
the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. Econ. Lit. 132, 157 (1995)
(environmental regulation has little impact on U.S.
competitiveness); Pharmaceutical Manufacturing
Category Effluent Limitations Final Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. 50,388, 50,408 (September 21, 1998)
(Pharmaceutical Manufacturing) (analyzing whether
rule might encourage new facilities to locate outside
the United States). In sum, financial models provide
tools for evaluating the many economic factors
associated with assessing a technology’s economic
availability to an industry. See Metal Products, 67
Fed. Reg. at 38,770-71 (discussing several different
models).
This availability requirement has imposed
significant restraints on the EPA’s ability to require
the best technologies. Courts have remanded rules to
EPA when it failed to adequately consider
affordability in cases where there might be a serious
issue in that regard. See, e.g., National Renderers
Ass’n v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 (8th Cir. 1976)
(finding a water pollution rule arbitrary because EPA
did not adequately consider whether costs would
affect the economic viability of medium-sized
facilities). And EPA has sometimes refused to require
the best performing technology, when it determines
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that a rule based on that technology will close a large
number of facilities. See, e.g., id. at 1288 & n.7
(noting that EPA exempted small facilities from its
rule, because it predicted many of them would
otherwise close); NWF, 286 F.3d at 565 (accepting
EPA’s conclusion that a particular technology is not
achievable because requiring it would lead to
bankruptcies).
Analysis of the relationship between costs and
benefits does not reveal whether a technology is
economically
available.
See
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing, 63 Fed. Reg. at 50,403 (stating that
the agency’s economic analysis includes “the impacts
of these rules” on firms and “also” a cost-benefit
analysis) (emphasis added); Effluent Limitations for
the Industrial Laundries Point Source Category, 64
Fed. Reg. 45,072, 45,078 (August 18, 1999)
(describing evaluation of facility closures, firm
failures, and cost-benefit analysis as separate
components of its economic assessment); Iron and
Steel, 67 Fed Reg. at 64,243 (describing an evaluation
of “corporate financial distress” and cost-benefit
analysis as separate components of a regulatory
impact analysis). Instead, CBA shifts the focus from
availability to a broad question about whether
pollution control is desirable in a given instance, a
question not mentioned in section 316(b). See
Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 98 n.10 (citing OMB
Circular A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Appendix
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A (1992)) (CBA is a method of assessing a policy’s
desirability) (emphasis added).
To see CBA’s irrelevance to technological
availability, consider a simplified example in which a
firm generating $500,000 in annual revenue must
employ an environmental technology requiring $1
million in additional annual cost. This cost produces
$10 million in incremental annual monetized
environmental benefits. Because annual cost exceeds
annual revenue, this technology is not economically
available to the firm, but requiring this technology
would be economically efficient, because the overall
benefits to society exceed the costs. Conversely,
imagine that the same $1 million annual incremental
expenditure occurs at a facility generating $1 billion
in annual revenue, but generates only $1,000 in
annual incremental benefits. In this case, the
measure may be economically available to the facility,
but a rule based on it would be economically
inefficient (assuming that all environmental benefits
have been accurately estimated and appropriately
valued). In each case, conclusions about a
technology’s availability hinge on analysis of the
firm’s finances rather than on the relationship
between costs and benefits. Financial analysis of costs’
predicted impacts on regulated firms’ operations in
light of their economic capabilities provides useful
information about a technology’s economic availability.
Monetization and quantification of benefits provides
no information relevant to assessing a technology’s
economic availability.
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Economic analysis of the question of whether a
proposed rule will trigger plant shutdowns focuses
upon the distribution, not the total amount, of costs.
Cf. I A Legislative History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Comm. Print 1973)
(Leg. Hist.) at 156, 217, 352-53, 375, 452, 456-57,
467, 480, 513-15, 561, 564-65, 613, 656-58, 731-33,
735-36, 738, 743-45, 1128-29, 1143, 1157, 1173, 1215,
1286, 1353-55, 1358-61 (showing overwhelming
Congressional focus on the job loss issue). A high cost
imposed on a very profitable facility might lead to
employment increases, as plant managers hire
technicians to install and operate equipment reducing
environmental impacts. See Goodstein, supra, at 171.
Conversely, a relatively modest cost imposed on a
marginal facility might lead to a shutdown, causing
significant unemployment. Hence, economic models
that compare costs to facilities’ economic capabilities
implicitly focus on cost distribution.
Not only does analysis of direct job losses require
a form of analysis focused on cost distribution rather
than aggregate costs and benefits, but the concern
about job loss itself constitutes a distributional
concern. See Driesen, Feasibility Principle, at 35-37. A
complete loss of income constitutes a heavily
concentrated cost for the worker losing a job, having a
significant impact on the worker concerned. See id. at
37 (describing the impact). The same amount of cost
producing widespread but modest price increases
usually does not implicate Congressional concerns
about immediate plant shutdowns. See id. at 35-36
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(explaining why widely distributed costs tend to have
insignificant impacts). Congressional focus on
availability thus reflects political concern for costs’
distribution, rather than maximization of net
benefits.
Economic theory recognizes that cost-benefit
analysis, because of its focus on economic efficiency,
does not resolve distributional questions. See
Jonathan Lesser, Daniel Dodds & Richard Zerbe, Jr.,
Environmental Economics and Policy 211 (1997)
(recognizing the rationality of pursuit of “non-economic
goals,” such as equity); Arrow et al., supra, at 221
(describing “concerns about fairness” as “important
noneconomic factors that merit consideration”).
Quantification and monetization of benefits does not
help to analyze the distributional concerns implicated
by the legislature’s emphasis on technological
availability.
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis Is Irrelevant to
Cost Effectiveness Analysis
The Second Circuit held that EPA may consider
“cost effectiveness” in crafting its standards.
Riverkeeper I, 475 F.3d at 98 (Congress intended that
EPA use cost effectiveness analysis in designing BAT
standards). Cost effectiveness analysis identifies the
cheapest means of achieving a predetermined goal.
Id. at 98 n.10 (citing OMB Circular A-94) (describing
cost effectiveness as a “systematic quantitative
method for comparing the costs of alternative means
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of achieving the same . . . given objective.”). Concerns
about cost effectiveness motivate a very substantial
economic literature on the form of regulation, and lie
behind economists’ support for pollution taxes and
emissions trading. See, e.g., Lesser, Dodds & Zerbe,
Jr., supra, at 231-33; W.D. Montgomery, Markets in
Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5
J. Econ. Theory 395 (1972).
The economic literature teaches that cost
effectiveness analysis does not involve monetization
or quantification of benefits and is therefore
analytically distinct from CBA.6 To carry out a cost
effectiveness analysis, EPA must identify and
compare the cost of several technologies or
approaches capable of meeting its previously
determined goal. Under § 316(b), this previously
determined goal is the minimization of adverse
environmental impacts from cooling water intake and
it is pursued through evaluation of the environmental
capabilities of various available technologies.
EPA may establish a performance standard based
on the best available technology’s capabilities, while
6

See, e.g., Scott Callan & Janet Thomas, Environmental
Economics & Management: Theory, Policy, and Applications 170
(4th ed. 2007); Barry Field, Environmental Economics: An
Introduction 13 (1994); Ahmed Hussen, Principles Of
Environmental Economics 188 (2d ed. 2000); Lesser, Dodds &
Zerbe, Jr., supra, at 230; Roger Perman, Yue Ma & James
McGilvray, Natural Resource and Environmental Economics 222
(1996); Clifford Russell, Applying Economics to the Environment
117 (2001); Tietenberg, supra, at 48-50.
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allowing facilities to use technologies other than the
technology EPA identified as the best, including
technologies invented after the rule’s promulgation,
to meet the standard. See generally Tietenberg,
supra, at 48-49. This approach invites facility owners
to carry out a cost effectiveness analysis to determine
which technologies provide the cheapest means of
achieving agency goals. Regulated firms usually have
better information than EPA does about the marginal
cost of employing various technologies at their own
plants. This “information asymmetry” supports EPA’s
practice of allowing firms some flexibility in choosing
technologies to meet EPA standards. See generally
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70
Am. Econ. Rev. 393, 404 (1980) (discussing market
implications of information asymmetry). But the ratio
of costs to benefits has no bearing on whether a
particular approach offers the cheapest way to meet a
predetermined goal. See Clifford Russell, Applying
Economics to the Environment 112-13 (2001)
(describing cost-effectiveness as “an application of
constrained
optimization”
that
provides
an
alternative to CBA); Wallace E. Oates, From Research
to Policy: The Case of Environmental Economics, 2000
U. Ill. L. Rev. 135, 135 (noting that standards under
the CWA are to be set “with little regard to their
economic implications”).
The distinction between CBA and cost
effectiveness analysis is especially important in a
system of distributed political power, where one
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governmental body might wish to delegate only part
of its authority to another. Whereas petitioners and
their supporters analogize regulatory CBA to
“everyday life” decisions such as the purchase of an
automobile, Federal Brief at 13, the better analogy is
to decisions in which authority, resources, expertise,
and responsibility are spread among multiple parties.
In such contexts, individuals might properly hesitate
to confer authority on agents to seek overall
efficiency.
For instance, a client might delegate decisions
about how to litigate a case to an attorney, but
reserve to itself the decision about when to settle in
light of anticipated costs and benefits. Or a parent
might offer to purchase the automobile of a teenage
child’s choosing, but still limit the extent to which the
child could trade off safety for other factors like speed
or styling. A rational policymaker might choose in
these contexts not to delegate authority to seek
overall efficiency, but instead to establish more
specific policies to guide the agent’s decisionmaking.
See I Leg. Hist. at 518-19 & n.1 (showing
Congressional consideration of CBA).
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III. EPA’S
COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
ILLUSTRATES WHY CONGRESS MAY
RATIONALLY HAVE REJECTED ITS USE
IN § 316(B)
Although now generally cited as an unequivocal
supporter of CBA, Professor Sunstein has argued
both that “there is a large difference between CBA
and standards of feasibility or achievability,” and that
the latter “might be preferred . . . on the ground that
they greatly ease the agency’s task, and in a way that
makes people far better off on balance.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone?, 53
Admin. L. Rev. 299, 311 (2001). EPA’s attempt to
transform the feasibility standard of § 316(b) into a
cost-benefit standard supports Professor Sunstein’s
claim.
A. Incomplete Information Made the Phase
II Cost-Benefit Analysis Unreliable
In the Phase II rulemaking, EPA focused on
“reductions in impingement and entrainment as a
quick, certain, and consistent metric for determining
performance.” Pet.App.169a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,586).
Increased fish survival became the primary
determining factor of the rulemaking because – at
least for those fish that are commercially or
recreationally valuable – that factor offered an
ecological benefit that was readily quantifiable and
monetizable.
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As the agency acknowledged, however, the
potential impact of cooling water intake structures is
much broader and more complex than these
quantified mortality effects. See EPA, Regional
Analysis Document for the Final Section 316(b) Phase
II Existing Facilities Rule, EPA-821-R-02-003,
February 12, 2004, at A9-1 (Final Rule RS)
(documenting numerous ways in which “the
organisms lost to [impingement and entrainment]
are critical to the continued functioning of the
ecosystems of which they are a part” and in which
those ecosystems provide valuable “ecological and
public services”).7 Among these broader impacts
was an unknown but nontrivial level of harm
posed to threatened or endangered species. See
Pet.App.173a-174a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,587).
Such additional environmental impacts, however,
received no monetary value in EPA’s economic
analysis. Indeed, as the agency candidly admitted,
even its focus on impingement and entrainment
losses was highly incomplete, as it only accounted for
losses insofar as they impacted commercial and
recreational fish harvests; hence, the agency “was not
able to monetize benefits for 98.2% of the age-one
equivalent losses of all commercial, recreational, and
forage species for the section 316(b) Phase II
regulation.” Final Rule EBA, supra, at C3-2. See also

7

This document is available at http://www.epa.gov/
waterscience/316b/phase2/casestudy/final.htm.
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Pet.App.499a (69 Fed. Reg. at 41,661) (“The Agency’s
direct use valuation does not account for the benefits
from the remaining 98.2% of the age 1 equivalent
aquatic organisms estimated to be protected
nationally under today’s rule.”).
In light of such incompleteness and uncertainty,
the agency warned that “[t]o rely only on estimated
use values would substantially undervalue the
benefits of the final section 316(b) rule.” Final Rule
RS, supra, at A9-8. Elsewhere, the agency offered the
sage advice that “[a] comparison of complete costs
and incomplete benefits does not provide an accurate
picture of net benefits to society,” Final Rule EBA,
supra, at D1-5, and that “there is a real possibility
that ignoring non-use values could result in serious
misallocation of resources,” Pet.App.499a (69 Fed.
Reg. at 41,660). Nevertheless, the agency ultimately
appeared to give these unquantified benefits no
weight in its conclusion about whether closed cycle
cooling was acceptable. See Final Rule EBA, supra, at
D1-4 (mentioning only monetized benefits).
With so many effects remaining off the balance
sheet, regulators had little reason to be confident
that the conclusions offered by CBA were
welfare-maximizing. Instead, alternative, more
stringent standards of environmental protection
might have been preferable to the CBA-based
approach,
given
the
many
non-quantified
environmental benefits of cooling water intake
reduction. See Frank Ackerman, Comments on
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Proposed Rule (August 1, 2002) at 9 tbl. 2, J.A. at 296
(discussing additional ecological impacts).
B. As Traditionally Understood and
Implemented, the Technology-Based
Standard of § 316(b) Would Have
Avoided
Limitations
of
EPA’s
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Even within the terms of welfare economics,
non-efficiency maximizing policy approaches such as
technology-based standards may appear desirable
when evaluated in real world policy contexts, where
information is incomplete and uncertain, where
administrative resources are limited, and where
technology is dynamically impacted by law itself. See,
e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is
Command-and-Control
Efficient?
Institutions,
Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of
Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental
Protection, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 887, 888-89 (observing
that historical, technological, and institutional factors
can occasionally render technology-based approaches
“the most efficient means of achieving a society’s
environmental
protection
goals”);
Juan-Pablo
Montero, Pollution Markets with Imperfectly
Observed Emissions, 36 RAND J. Econ. 645 (2005)
(demonstrating that when regulators can accurately
monitor abatement technology but not emissions and
output levels, standard-based approaches may
outperform alternatives under certain market
conditions).
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Such second-best considerations are at the heart
of the CWA, given the great difficulty experienced
attempting to identify and enforce standards prior to
the 1972 amendments. Cf. J. H. Dales, Pollution,
Property & Prices: An Essay in Policy-making and
Economics 39 (1968) (a leading economist’s
statement, prior to the Act’s passage, that an
economist cannot say that one policy is superior to
another because he “is quite unable to draw up a neat
table showing all benefits and costs”). As is well
recognized, Congress’s general approach in the
amendments was to circumvent the informational
demands, scientific uncertainties, and valuation
questions that had frustrated the task of basing
standards for dischargers on the effect of pollution on
water quality. See EPA v. State Water Resources
Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976).
Because the language of § 316(b) closely
resembles the language of the most stringent
technology-based standards in the CWA, EPA should
have focused simply on the affordability of
increasingly
efficacious
environmental
control
technologies, recognizing that Congress itself already
had determined that the benefits of cooling water
intake regulation are sufficiently vast and difficult to
quantify that only the “best” control technology will
suffice. Instead, EPA essentially relived the failed
pre-1972 experience under the CWA through its failed
effort to complete a reliable CBA of the Phase II
rulemaking.
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In this respect, it is useful to recall that the
stated goal of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The goal is not
to view those waters as merely contingent resources,
to be impaired or sacrificed at any moment for the
promotion of an abstract and undifferentiated
maximization of welfare.
Earlier, EPA seemed to recognize that allowing
the degraded condition of a water body to reduce the
level of legal protection that it receives – as the agency
ultimately decided to allow through its CBA-based
approach – would be inconsistent with the CWA’s more
dynamic, long-term goal of progressively restoring the
ecological integrity of the nation’s water bodies. Cf.
Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and
Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and
Environmental Regulation, 46 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 159, 199 n.194 (1983) (quoting Senator Bayh
as explaining that the technology-based standards of
the CWA were intended to “force industry to do the
best job it can do to clean up the nation’s water and to
keep making progress without incurring such
massive costs that economic chaos would result”).
When offering its proposed Phase II rule, for instance,
EPA stated that, in addition to expressly quantified
impacts, it was “concerned about the cumulative
overall degradation of the aquatic environment as a
consequence of . . . intakes located with or adjacent to
an impaired waterbody.” See 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122,
17,136 (April 9, 2002).
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Conversely, a “comprehensive . . . attempt ‘to
restore’ ” the ecological integrity of waters, Bayview
Homes, 474 U.S. at 132-33 (1985), through pollution
controls, wetlands conservation, and other measures
should increase fish populations, and therefore the
value of the benefits of technology reducing water
intake, over time. See EPA, Economic and Benefits
Analysis for the Proposed Section 316(b) Phase II
Existing Facilities Rule, EPA-821-R-02-001, February
2002, at C1-6, item 5.18 (acknowledging likely
underestimation of benefits because current water
quality has improved since the 20-year-old data relied
upon was generated). Through its subtle shift from
expressing concern over the impact of cooling water
intake structures on impaired water bodies to using
estimated impairment levels as an efficiency-oriented
rationale for lowering levels of protection, EPA
seemed to abandon the CWA’s mandate to
progressively
restructure
the
economic
and
technological landscape that gives rise to any
momentary depiction of costs and benefits.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

8

This document is available at http://www.epa.gov/
waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/ (last visited September
30, 2008).
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CONCLUSION
Regulators should use economic methods
appropriate to the decision before them. CBA
provides a tool for choosing allocatively efficient
regulation. Other modes of economic analysis,
however, fit a mandate to minimize environmental
impacts within the limits of available technology.
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